Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105327
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Cited by:
- Martin Eling & Irina Gemmo & Danjela Guxha & Hato Schmeiser, 2024. "Big data, risk classification, and privacy in insurance markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 49(1), pages 75-126, March.
- Jose Higueras, 2023. "Robust Regulation of Firms' Access to Consumer Data," Papers 2305.05822, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
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More about this item
Keywords
Disclosure; Adverse selection; Mechanism design; Privacy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Statistics
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