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Search for an object with two attributes

Author

Listed:
  • Olszewski, Wojciech
  • Wolinsky, Asher

Abstract

This paper presents and analyzes a simple equilibrium search model. On one side, there is a population of searchers; on the other side, a population of objects. Searchers are strategic decision makers who are there to get matched to an object, while objects have no preferences or decisions to make. The main novelty is that an object is characterized by two attributes, but a searcher can observe only one at the point of decision. This generates some interesting phenomena such as multiplicity of equilibria, in some of which the searcher's payoff is a discontinuous function of the observed attribute and the adoption decision is not everywhere monotonic in the observed attribute.

Suggested Citation

  • Olszewski, Wojciech & Wolinsky, Asher, 2016. "Search for an object with two attributes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 145-160.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:161:y:2016:i:c:p:145-160
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven J. Davis, 2001. "The Quality Distribution of Jobs and the Structure of Wages in Search Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 8434, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Chade, Hector, 2006. "Matching with noise and the acceptance curse," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 81-113, July.
    3. Ken Burdett & Melvyn G. Coles, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 141-168.
    4. Ben Lockwood, 1991. "Information Externalities in the Labour Market and the Duration of Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(4), pages 733-753.
    5. Arnaud Chéron & Jean‐Olivier Hairault & François Langot, 2011. "Age‐Dependent Employment Protection," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(557), pages 1477-1504, December.
    6. Neeman Z., 1996. "On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 54-54, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arjada Bardhi, 2024. "Attributes: Selective Learning and Influence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(2), pages 311-353, March.
    2. Liu, Lin & Wang, X. Henry, 2023. "Partial sequential search and product differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
    3. Obih, Uchenna & Baiyegunhi, Lloyd J. S., . "Implicit price estimation of quality attributes influencing rice prices and choice decisions of consumers in Nigeria," Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development, University of Life Sciences, Poznan, Poland, vol. 45(3).
    4. Liu, Lin & Wang, X. Henry, 2021. "Product differentiation and equilibrium price with partial product search," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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