On the Role of Banks in Enterprise Restructuring: The Polish Example
Governments throughout Eastern Europe have been singularly unsuccessful in dealing with large loss-making SOEs. A more promising approach would create an incentive framework and legal environment where the SOE's major non-government creditor can take the lead in initiating restructuring and the design of a new, viable capital structure. Such a lead bank is much more likely to gain access to the inside knowledge that gives the firm its surplus value as a going concern. The details of such an environment are laid out using the recent Polish attempt to launch a wholesale cleanup of the loss-making SOEs along lines promoted in this paper.
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