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Industry expert directors

Author

Listed:
  • Drobetz, Wolfgang
  • von Meyerinck, Felix
  • Oesch, David
  • Schmid, Markus

Abstract

We analyze the valuation effect of board industry experience and channels through which industry experience of outside directors relates to firm value. Our analysis shows that firms with more experienced outside directors are valued at a premium compared to firms with less experienced outside directors. Additional analyses, including a quasi-experimental setting based on director deaths, mitigate endogeneity concerns. The association between having directors with more industry experience and higher firm value is more pronounced for firms with larger investment programs, larger cash reserves, and during crises. In contrast, it is weaker in more dynamic industries, i.e., industries that rank high in terms of sales growth, R&D expenditures, merger activities, competitive threat, and product market changes, where the value of previously acquired experience is likely to be diminished. Overall, our findings are consistent with board industry experience being a valuable corporate governance mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Drobetz, Wolfgang & von Meyerinck, Felix & Oesch, David & Schmid, Markus, 2018. "Industry expert directors," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 195-215.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:92:y:2018:i:c:p:195-215
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.04.019
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yuan, Rongli & Liu, Chao & Xiao, Jason Zezhong & Sun, Jian, 2018. "The determinants and effects of voluntary adoption of a cumulative voting system: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 251-266.
    2. Roman Lanis & Grant Richardson & Brett Govendir & Gregory Pazmandy, 2021. "The effect of board of directors’ expertise and tax avoidance on corporate debt," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(3), pages 4475-4511, September.
    3. Burns, Natasha & Minnick, Kristina & Smith, Aimee Hoffmann, 2021. "The role of directors with related supply chain industry experience in corporate acquisition decisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    4. Felix von Meyerinck & Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi & Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoff Solomon, 2019. "As California goes, so goes the nation? Board gender quotas and the legislation of non-economic values," Working Papers on Finance 1904, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Dec 2019.
    5. Peter J Baldacchino & Jean Paul Abela & Norbert Tabone & Simon Grima, 2021. "Board of Director Diversity and Its Corporate Governance Implications in Maltese Equity-Listed Companies," International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, vol. 11(4), pages 37-65.
    6. Lien‐Wen Liang & Tsui‐Jung Lin & Hui‐Fun Yu & Ya‐Wen Li, 2022. "The impact of political connection and board diversity on company performance: Evidence from China," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 2347-2357, September.
    7. Sun, Liang, 2021. "Does the location of directors' additional positions matter? A new dimension of board structure," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    8. Ziwei Wang & Chunfeng Wang & Zhenming Fang, 2023. "Common institutional ownership and corporate misconduct," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(1), pages 102-136, January.
    9. Gopalan, Radhakrishnan & Gormley, Todd A. & Kalda, Ankit, 2021. "It’s not so bad: Director bankruptcy experience and corporate risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 261-292.
    10. Kim, Taeyeon & Kim, Hyun-Dong & Park, Kwangwoo, 2023. "Customer concentration and firm risk: The role of outside directors from a major customer," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    11. Tri Tri Nguyen & Chau Minh Duong & Nguyet Thi Minh Nguyen & Hung Quang Bui, 2020. "Accounting conservatism and banking expertise on board of directors," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 501-539, August.
    12. Ozbek, O. Volkan, 2021. "Market Performance of Spun-Off Subsidiaries: Effects of Board Independence and Directors’ Industry Experience," American Business Review, Pompea College of Business, University of New Haven, vol. 24(1), pages 249-267, May.
    13. Momtaz, Paul P., 2021. "Entrepreneurial Finance and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Token Offerings," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 36(5).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Board of directors; Director skills and experience; Corporate governance; Corporate investments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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