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Optimal remedies for patent infringement

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  • Hylton, Keith N.
  • Zhang, Mengxi

Abstract

This paper derives optimal remedies for patent infringement, examining damages awards and injunctions. The fundamental optimality condition that applies to both awards and injunctions equates the marginal static cost of intellectual property protection with the marginal “dynamic” benefit from the innovation thereby induced. When the social value of the patent is sufficiently high, the optimal award induces socially efficient investment by giving the innovator the entire social value of her investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Hylton, Keith N. & Zhang, Mengxi, 2017. "Optimal remedies for patent infringement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 44-57.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:44-57
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2017.07.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schankerman, Mark & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001. "Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 199-220, Spring.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Leandro M. Meller, 2022. "Patent Length and Breadth as Policy Instruments: A Systematic Review of Recent Contributions to the Theory of Optimal Patent Design," Working Papers 192, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    2. Zhang, Ya-Feng & Li, Li-Ming & Xu, Ke, 2022. "Do specialized intellectual property courts show a pro-patent propensity? Evidence from China," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    3. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 2021. "Patent assertion entities and the courts: Injunctive or fee-based relief?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    4. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 2023. "Intellectual property infringement by foreign firms: Import protection through the ITC or court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    5. Ribeiro, Barbara & Shapira, Philip, 2020. "Private and public values of innovation: A patent analysis of synthetic biology," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(1).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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