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A solution to the problem of nuisance suits: The option to have the court bar settlement

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  • Rosenberg, David
  • Shavell, Steven

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  • Rosenberg, David & Shavell, Steven, 2006. "A solution to the problem of nuisance suits: The option to have the court bar settlement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 42-51, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:26:y:2006:i:1:p:42-51
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rosenberg, D. & Shavell, S., 1985. "A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-13, June.
    2. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1988. "Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 437-450, June.
    3. Ayres, Ian & Madison, Kristin, 2000. "Threatening inefficient performance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 818-828, May.
    4. Katz, Avery, 1990. "The effect of frivolous lawsuits on the settlement of litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 3-27, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Farmer Amy & Pecorino Paul, 2014. "Litigation with Default Judgments," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-20, July.
    2. Jesse Bull, 2022. "Interrogation and Disclosure of Evidence," Working Papers 2212, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    3. Guha, Brishti, 2016. "Malicious litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 24-32.
    4. Chulyoung Kim, 2018. "Judge’s gate-keeping power and deterrence of negligent acts: an economic analysis of Twombly and Iqbal," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 39-66, August.
    5. Jesse Bull, 2013. "Interrogation and Evidence Fabrication," Working Papers 1303, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    6. Campos, Sergio J. & Cotton, Christopher S. & Li, Cheng, 2015. "Deterrence effects under Twombly: On the costs of increasing pleading standards in litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 61-71.
    7. Paul Jesilow & Julianne Ohlander, 2010. "The Impact of Tort Reforms on the Sanctioning of Physicians by State Licensing Boards," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 117-140, March.
    8. Kim, Iljoong & Kim, Jaehong, 2015. "Frivolous Suits In The Infinitely-Repeated Litigation Game With Uncertainty," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 56(1), pages 21-33, June.
    9. repec:hit:hitjcm:v:56:y:2015:i:1:p:21-33 is not listed on IDEAS

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