Interrogation and Disclosure of Evidence

In recent years there has been a shift to less confrontational interrogation methods. One argument in favor of these methods is that they reduce the scope for false confessions. This paper explores this idea from an information perspective with rational agents. Should a police officer choose to interrogate an accused person, the goal is a confession. The police officer bases her decision of whether to interrogate on both the realization of some evidence and on a private non-verifiable signal; both of these influence the outcome at trial, should the case proceed to trial. So there are potentially two channels of information to the accused: 1) that the police officer decided to interrogate, and 2) the presentation of evidence to the accused during interrogation. The accused chooses whether to confess by weighing his expected payoff from going to trial against that from confessing. Less confrontational interrogation methods close the second channel of information and can reduce false confessions while still inducing guilty to confess. It is helpful for the accused to be somewhat informed about the strength of the case against him, and this comes through being interrogated. However, it can be detrimental for the accused to be too well informed about the strength of the case against him.