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Settling with Multiple Litigants

Listed author(s):
  • Nakkas Alper

    (Vanderbilt University)

This paper considers a class of complete information pretrial settlement bargaining games in which externalities can naturally arise due to the existence of multiple litigants. As opposed to earlier literature, it is shown that parties can always settle even though there are bargaining externalities.

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Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 6 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 125-144

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:6:y:2010:i:1:n:6
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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-1335, November.
  2. Kornhauser, Lewis A & Revesz, Richard L, 1994. "Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 41-76, January.
  3. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  4. Steven Shavell, 1992. "Suit Versus Settlement When Parties Seek Nonmonetary Judgements," NBER Working Papers 4012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Klerman, Daniel, 1996. "Settling Multidefendant Lawsuits: The Advantage of Conditional Setoff Rules," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 445-462, June.
  6. Chang, Howard F & Sigman, Hilary, 2000. "Incentives to Settle under Joint and Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 205-236, January.
  7. Kathryn E. Spier, 2002. "Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role of Insolvency," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 295-323, October.
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