Judge's Gate-Keeping Power and Deterrence of Negligent Acts: An Economic Analysis of Twombly and Iqbal
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsTwombly; Iqbal; deterrence; litigation costs; error costs; perfect Bayesian equilibrium;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-03-23 (All new papers)
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