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Pricing optional group term insurance: a new approach using reservation prices

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  • Ramsay, Colin M.

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  • Ramsay, Colin M., 2005. "Pricing optional group term insurance: a new approach using reservation prices," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 37-55, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:insuma:v:36:y:2005:i:1:p:37-55
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J. David, 2001. "An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199243273, Decembrie.
    2. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
    3. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    4. Kliger, Doron & Levikson, Benny, 1998. "Pricing insurance contracts -- an economic viewpoint," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 243-249, July.
    5. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    6. James Vaupel & Kenneth Manton & Eric Stallard, 1979. "The impact of heterogeneity in individual frailty on the dynamics of mortality," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 16(3), pages 439-454, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hofmann, Annette & Nell, Martin & Pohl, Philipp, 2007. "The optimal pricing strategy for an insurer when risk preferences are stochastically distributed," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 20, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.

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