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Comparing predicted prices in auctions for online advertising

Author

Listed:
  • Bax, Eric
  • Kuratti, Anand
  • Mcafee, Preston
  • Romero, Julian

Abstract

Online publishers sell opportunities to show ads. Some advertisers pay only if their ad elicits a user response. Publishers estimate response rates for ads in order to estimate expected revenues from showing the ads. Then publishers select ads that maximize estimated expected revenue.

Suggested Citation

  • Bax, Eric & Kuratti, Anand & Mcafee, Preston & Romero, Julian, 2012. "Comparing predicted prices in auctions for online advertising," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 80-88.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:30:y:2012:i:1:p:80-88
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.06.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jorion, Philippe, 1986. "Bayes-Stein Estimation for Portfolio Analysis," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 279-292, September.
    2. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, September.
    3. Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "Anomalies: The Winner's Curse," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 191-202, Winter.
    4. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 242-259, March.
    5. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 2001. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 375-417, April.
    6. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    7. Hal R. Varian, 2009. "Online Ad Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 430-434, May.
    8. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan & Eric Bax & Krishna Prasad Chitrapura & Sachin Garg, 2015. "Portfolio Allocation for Sellers in Online Advertising," Papers 1506.02020, arXiv.org.
    2. R. McAfee, 2011. "The Design of Advertising Exchanges," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 39(3), pages 169-185, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reversion; Validation; Bias; Auction; Prediction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
    • C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
    • C45 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Neural Networks and Related Topics
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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