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Regulation, competition, and the optimal recovery of stranded costs

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  • Beard, T. Randolph
  • Kaserman, David L.
  • Mayo, John W.

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  • Beard, T. Randolph & Kaserman, David L. & Mayo, John W., 2003. "Regulation, competition, and the optimal recovery of stranded costs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 831-848, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:21:y:2003:i:6:p:831-848
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brennan, Timothy J & Boyd, James, 1997. "Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Constracts," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 41-54, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lewis Evans & Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 239-264, May.
    2. Andrea Gavosto & Guido Ponte & Carla Scaglioni, 2007. "Investment in Next Generation Networks and the Role of Regulation: A Real Option Approach," Working Papers Department of Economics 2007/31, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
    3. Evans, Lewis & Guthrie, Graeme, 2003. "Asset Stranding is Inevitable: Implications for Optimal Regulatory Design," Working Paper Series 3881, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    4. repec:eee:eneeco:v:66:y:2017:i:c:p:384-398 is not listed on IDEAS

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