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Receiver discretion in signalling models: Information transmission to competing retailers

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  • Albaek, Svend
  • Overgaard, Per Baltzer

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  • Albaek, Svend & Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 1998. "Receiver discretion in signalling models: Information transmission to competing retailers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 209-228, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:16:y:1998:i:2:p:209-228
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
    2. Svend Albæk & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1998. "Signaling and rent extraction vis contract proposals in franchising," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    3. Lafontaine, Francine, 1993. "Contractual Arrangements as Signaling Devices: Evidence from Franchising," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 256-289, October.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    5. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
    6. Nancy T. Gallini & Brian D. Wright, 1990. "Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 147-160, Spring.
    7. Gallini, Nancy T & Lutz, Nancy A, 1992. "Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 471-501, October.
    8. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    9. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "Price Strategy Oligopoly with Product Variation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 30-44.
    10. Svend Albák & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1992. "Upstream Pricingand Advertising Signal Downstream Demand," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(4), pages 677-698, December.
    11. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
    12. Wujin Chu, 1992. "Demand Signalling and Screening in Channels of Distribution," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 11(4), pages 327-347.
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