An antitrust analysis of the case for wireless network neutrality
The ongoing debate about possible implementation of regulatory rules requiring "network neutrality" for wireless telecommunications services is inherently about whether to impose prohibitions on the ability of network operators to control their vertical relationships. Antitrust analysis is well suited to analyze whether a wireless network neutrality rule is socially beneficial. Implementing network neutrality rules would be akin to using a per se antitrust rule regarding vertical relationships instead of the rule of reason analysis typically applied to vertical relationships in antitrust. Per se rules are used to prevent actions that rarely, if ever, have any procompetitive benefits, such as price-fixing agreements. Rule of reason analysis is used when there are potential efficiency gains from the actions under investigation. Some vertical practices of the wireless carriers, such as bandwidth restrictions, may appear to be anticompetitive, but may also have plausible efficiency justifications so should be judged under rule of reason analysis. Economic examination of the wireless industry shows significant competition between networks, which reduces the concern about vertical relationships, but also shows some areas that should be monitored by antitrust and regulatory authorities. We propose several regulatory changes that would likely increase wireless competition and lessen the perceived need for prophylactic network neutrality rules while at the same time allowing efficiency-enhancing vertical relationships.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Beard, T Randolph & Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W, 2001. "Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 319-333, September.
- Mayo, John W. & Wallsten, Scott, 2010. "Enabling efficient wireless communications: The role of secondary spectrum markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 61-72, March.
- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003.
"A Primer on Foreclosure,"
IDEI Working Papers
203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005.
- repec:reg:rpubli:214 is not listed on IDEAS
- Farrell, Joseph & Weiser, Philip J., 2003.
"Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age,"
Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series
qt5ps3f7p9, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, 2003. "Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards A Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation In The Internet Age," Industrial Organization 0303007, EconWPA.
- Farrell, Joseph & Weiser, Philip J., 2003. "Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4dh7q2dd, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Michael D. Grubb, 2009.
"Selling to Overconfident Consumers,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1770-1807, December.
- Mayo John W, 2008. "It's No Time to Regulate Wireless Telephony," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-4, February.
- Mark L. Burton & David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, 2009. "Common Costs And Cross-Subsidies: Misestimation Versus Misallocation," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(2), pages 193-199, 04.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:22:y:2010:i:1:p:103-119. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.