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Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age

Author

Listed:
  • Farrell, Joseph
  • Weiser, Philip J.

Abstract

This article aims to help regulators and commentators incorporate both Chicago School and post-Chicago School arguments in assessing whether regulation should mandate open access to information platforms. The authors outline three alternative models that the FCC could adopt to guide its regulation of information platforms in the future and facilitate a true convergence between antitrust and regulatory policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Farrell, Joseph & Weiser, Philip J., 2003. "Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt5ps3f7p9, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:compol:qt5ps3f7p9
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Werden, Gregory J & Froeb, Luke M, 1994. "The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 407-426, October.
    2. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:06 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Roy J. Epstein & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2002. "Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications," Industrial Organization 0201002, EconWPA.
    4. Berry, Steven & Levinsohn, James & Pakes, Ariel, 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 841-890, July.
    5. Deaton, Angus S & Muellbauer, John, 1980. "An Almost Ideal Demand System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 312-326, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    vertical integration; leverage; ICE; one monopoly profit; antitrust; telecommunications;

    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General

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