Business, ethics, and profit: Are they compatible under corporate governance in our global economy?
It has been the traditional belief that profits and ethics are at odds with each other in the world of business. Corporate governance appears to be a hindrance or a drag on profit maximization. This work shows that moral codes, public interest and social values pose no threat to profit maximization of any firm. It is demonstrated with the illustration of transfer pricing and public goods-based economy that profits and ethics are quite compatible within the strait jacket of societal norms and corporate goals.
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