An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
Bipolar games are normal form games with two pure strategies for each player and with two strict equilibrium points without common equilibrium strategies. A normal form game has linear incentives, if for each player the difference between the payoffs for any two pure strategies depends linearly on the probabilities in the mixed strategies used by the other players. A measure of risk dominance between two strict equilibrium points of a bipolar game with linear incentives is characterized by 11 axioms. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
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