Bargaining with a property rights owner
We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the intellectual property rights owner (IPRO) can allocate licenses for the use of this property among the interested parties (agents). The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the licensees to the IPRO. We state five axioms and characterize the bargaining solutions which satisfy these axioms. In a solution every agent obtains a weighted average of his individually rational level and his marginal contribution to the set of all players, where the weights are the same across all agents and all bargaining problems. The IPRO obtains the remaining surplus. The symmetric solution is the nucleolus of a naturally related coalitional game.
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