Government intervention in response to the subprime financial crisis: The good into the pot, the bad into the crop
The subprime-related 2007/2008 global financial crisis represented a major economic challenge. In order to prevent such episodes of market failure, it is vital to understand what caused the crisis and which lessons are to be learned. Given the tremendous bailout packages worldwide, we discuss the role of governments as lenders of last resort. In our view, it is important not to suspend the market mechanism of bankruptcy via granting rescue packages. Only those institutions which are illiquid but solvent should be rescued, and this should occur at a significant cost for the respective institution. We provide a formal illustration of a rescue mechanism, which allows to distinguish between illiquid but solvent and insolvent banks. Furthermore, we argue that stricter regulation cannot be the sole consequence of the crisis. There appears to be a need for improved risk awareness, more sophisticated risk management and a better alignment of interests among the participants in the market for credit risk.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul S. Mills & John Kiff, 2007. "Money for Nothing and Checks for Free; Recent Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets," IMF Working Papers 07/188, International Monetary Fund.
- Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2004.
"Liquidity, Efficiency, and Bank Bailouts,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 455-483, June.
- Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2002. "Liquidity, Efficiency and Bank Bailouts," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-33, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2002. "Liquidity, Efficiency and Bank Bailouts," NBER Working Papers 9158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2008. "Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of Bank Failures," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(6), pages 2705-2742, November.
- Viral Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2007. "Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures," Bank of England working papers 328, Bank of England.
- Gary B. Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, 2007. "Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization," NBER Chapters,in: The Risks of Financial Institutions, pages 549-602 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, 2005. "Special purpose vehicles and securitization," Working Papers 05-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Gary Gorton & Nicholas Souleles, 2005. "Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization," NBER Working Papers 11190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton & Steven Fries, 1999. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 1-51, March.
- Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, 1988. "Financial deregulation, monetary policy, and central banking," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue May, pages 3-22.
- Goodfriend, M. & King, R.G., 1988. "Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, And Central Banking," RCER Working Papers 121, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, 1988. "Financial deregulation, monetary policy, and central banking," Working Paper 88-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2005. "Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 615-647, 04.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2002. "Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises," NBER Working Papers 8937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2003. "Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises," NBER Working Papers 10071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, 2010. "An Overview of the Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions-super-," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 10(s1), pages 1-26.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-419, June.
- Gary Gorton, 2009. "The Subprime Panic," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 15(1), pages 10-46.
- Gary Gorton, 2008. "The Subprime Panic," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2504, Yale School of Management.
- Gary B. Gorton, 2008. "The Subprime Panic," NBER Working Papers 14398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December.
- Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil K, 2010. "Will the U.S. bank recapitalization succeed? Eight lessons from Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 398-417, September.
- Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, 2008. "Will the U.S. Bank Recapitalization Succeed? Eight Lessons from Japan," NBER Working Papers 14401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Linus Wilson, 2010. "The put problem with buying toxic assets," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(1-2), pages 31-35.
- Bebchuk Lucian A., 2008. "A Better Plan for Addressing the Financial Crisis," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 5(5), pages 1-8, September.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2002. "Bank Bailouts and Aggregate Liquidity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 38-41, May.
- Franke, Günter & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2008. "The future of securitization," CFS Working Paper Series 2008/31, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Martin Scheicher, 2003. "Credit Derivatives - Overview and Implications for Monetary Policy and Financial Stability," Financial Stability Report, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 5, pages 96-111.
- Xavier Freixas, 1999. "Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity," Economics Working Papers 400, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- X. Freixas, 2000. "Optimal Bail Out Policy, Conditionality and Constructive Ambiguity," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 49, Netherlands Central Bank.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:19:y:2010:i:4:p:289-297. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.