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Firm family firms: Current debates of corporate governance in family firms

Author

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  • Aguilera, Ruth V.
  • Crespi-Cladera, Rafel

Abstract

We reassess the effects of family ownership and strong family control on non-family minority and non-controlling shareholders. We argue that assumptions and interpretations regarding the cost and benefits of family ownership in the extant literature need to be understood relative to other firm governance arrangements. More specifically, we posit and examine the relevance of the private benefits of family control in two key circumstances: top executive succession and the nature of family business groups. Diverse outcomes are shown to be contingent on the national institutional settings where firms are located.

Suggested Citation

  • Aguilera, Ruth V. & Crespi-Cladera, Rafel, 2012. "Firm family firms: Current debates of corporate governance in family firms," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 66-69.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:fambus:v:3:y:2012:i:2:p:66-69
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.03.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2202, October.
    2. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
    3. Marianne Bertrand & Paras Mehta & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2002. "Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(1), pages 121-148.
    4. Anderson, Ronald C. & Duru, Augustine & Reeb, David M., 2009. "Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the United States," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 205-222, May.
    5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    6. Danes Sharon M., 2011. "Pillow Talk Leaks: Integrating Couple Interactions into Entrepreneurship Research," Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 1(3), pages 1-7, July.
    7. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    8. Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, 2007. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(2), pages 331-372, June.
    9. Francisco Pérez-González, 2006. "Inherited Control and Firm Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1559-1588, December.
    10. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
    11. Heitor V. Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2006. "A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2637-2680, December.
    12. Michael N. Young & Mike W. Peng & David Ahlstrom & Garry D. Bruton & Yi Jiang, 2008. "Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 196-220, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michel, Alexandra & Kammerlander, Nadine, 2015. "Trusted advisors in a family business's succession-planning process—An agency perspective," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-57.
    2. Elitsa R. Banalieva & Kimberly A. Eddleston & Thomas M. Zellweger, 2015. "When do family firms have an advantage in transitioning economies? Toward a dynamic institution-based view," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(9), pages 1358-1377, September.
    3. repec:ibn:ijefaa:v:9:y:2017:i:10:p:128-135 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Garcia-Castro, Roberto & Aguilera, Ruth V., 2014. "Family involvement in business and financial performance: A set-theoretic cross-national inquiry," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 85-96.
    5. Guidice, Rebecca M. & Mero, Neal P. & Greene, Juanne V., 2013. "Perceptions of accountability in family business: Using accountability theory to understand differences between family and nonfamily executives," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 233-244.
    6. Aguilera, Ruth V. & Crespi-Cladera, Rafel, 2016. "Global corporate governance: On the relevance of firms’ ownership structure," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 50-57.
    7. repec:eee:fambus:v:8:y:2017:i:2:p:109-122 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Goel, Sanjay & Mazzola, Pietro & Phan, Phillip H. & Pieper, Torsten M. & Zachary, Ramona K., 2012. "Strategy, ownership, governance, and socio-psychological perspectives on family businesses from around the world," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 54-65.
    9. Lidia Mannarino & Valeria Pupo & Fernanda Ricotta, 2016. "Family Firms And Productivity: The Role Of Institutional Quality," Working Papers 201605, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
    10. Esra Memili & Kaustav Misra, 2015. "Corporate Governance Provisions, Family Involvement, and Firm Performance in Publicly Traded Family Firms," International Journal of Financial Studies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(3), pages 1-36, July.

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