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Decommissioning wind energy projects: An economic and political analysis

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  • Ferrell, Shannon L.
  • DeVuyst, Eric A.

Abstract

Wind energy is the fastest-growing segment of new electrical power capacity in the United States, with the potential for significant growth in the future. To facilitate such growth, a number of concerns between developers and landowners must be resolved, including assurance of wind turbine decommissioning at the end of their useful lives. Oklahoma legislators enlisted the authors to develop an economically-sound proposal to ensure developers complete their decommissioning obligations. Economic analysis of turbine decommissioning is complicated by a lack of operational experience, as few U.S. projects have been decommissioned. This leads to a lack of data regarding decommissioning costs. Politically, the negotiation leading to the finally-enacted solution juxtaposed economic theory against political pragmatism, leading to a different but hopefully sound solution. This article will provide background for the decommissioning issue, chronicle the development of the decommissioning component of the Oklahoma Wind Energy Act, and frame issues that remain for policymakers in regulating wind power development.

Suggested Citation

  • Ferrell, Shannon L. & DeVuyst, Eric A., 2013. "Decommissioning wind energy projects: An economic and political analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 105-113.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:53:y:2013:i:c:p:105-113
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
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    1. Cartelle Barros, Juan José & Lara Coira, Manuel & de la Cruz López, María Pilar & del Caño Gochi, Alfredo, 2015. "Assessing the global sustainability of different electricity generation systems," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 473-489.

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