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De l'utilité du calcul économique public

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  • Roger Guesnerie

    (Collège de France - Chaire Théorie économique et organisation sociale - CdF (institution) - Collège de France, PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This is the text of the opening lecture to the "Journées de l'Association Française de Science Economique", held at Rennes, (2004). In accordance with the rules of the exercise, the article provides a broad assessment of the difficulties and usefulness of cost benefit analysis, as a tool for to-day public decisions. The analysis both emphasizes the changes of the institutional environment in which public cost-benefit analysis takes places, the merits of its "software" (its foundations), and of its "hardware" (its implementation techniques).

Suggested Citation

  • Roger Guesnerie, 2006. "De l'utilité du calcul économique public," Working Papers halshs-00590538, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590538
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00590538
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guesnerie, Roger, 1975. "Production of the public sector and taxation in a simple second best model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 127-156, April.
    2. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    3. Roger Guesnerie, 2004. "Calcul économique et développement durable," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 55(3), pages 363-382.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    5. Roger Guesnerie, 2001. "Second Best Redistributive Policies: The Case Of International Trade," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(1), pages 15-25, January.
    6. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alain Bonnafous & Yves Crozet & Aurélie Mercier & Nicolas Ovtracht & Valérie Thiebaut, 2009. "MOSART (MOdélisation et Simulation de l'Accessibilité aux Réseaux et aux Territoires) : un prototype d'outil d'aide à la décision, individuelle et collective pour une mobilité durable. Rapport final," Working Papers halshs-01707182, HAL.
    2. Pham, Hai-Vu, 2010. "La dimension conflictuelle des projets d’infrastructure : essais sur la décision publique, le contentieux et les prix immobiliers," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/5656 edited by Torre, André & Kirat, Thierry.
    3. Pham, Hai Vu & Kirat, Thierry & Torre, Andre, 2012. "Les conflits d’usage dans les espaces ruraux et périurbains. Le cas des infrastructures franciliennes," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 332(November-).

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