IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eneeco/v26y2004i2p239-259.html

An empirical analysis of the determinants of high bonus bids for petroleum leases in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)

Author

Listed:
  • Iledare, Omowumi O.
  • Pulsipher, Allan G.
  • Olatubi, Williams O.
  • Mesyanzhinov, Dmitry V.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Iledare, Omowumi O. & Pulsipher, Allan G. & Olatubi, Williams O. & Mesyanzhinov, Dmitry V., 2004. "An empirical analysis of the determinants of high bonus bids for petroleum leases in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 239-259, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:26:y:2004:i:2:p:239-259
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140-9883(04)00002-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:aen:journl:1995v16-02-a03 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:aen:journl:1981v02-03-a06 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Mead, Walter J & Moseidjord, Asbjorn & Sorensen, Philip E, 1984. "Competitive Bidding under Asymmetrical Information: Behavior and Performance in Gulf of Mexico Drainage Lease Sales, 1959-1969," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 66(3), pages 505-508, August.
    4. repec:aen:journl:1983v04-04-a03 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Thomas J. Teisberg, 1980. "Federal Management of Energy and Mineral Resources on the Public Lands," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 448-465, Autumn.
    6. C.E. Moody Jr. & W.J. Kruvant, 1988. "Joint Bidding, Entry, and the Price of OCS Leases," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 276-284, Summer.
    7. repec:aen:journl:1994v15-04-a01 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Rockwood, Alan, 1983. "The Impact of Joint Ventures on the Market for OCS Oil and Gas Leases," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 453-468, June.
    9. C. E. Moody, Jr. & W. J. Kruvant, 1990. "OCS Leasing Policy and Lease Prices," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 66(1), pages 30-39.
    10. Porter, Robert H, 1995. "The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 1-27, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Brasil, Eric Universo Rodrigues & Postali, Fernando Antonio Slaibe, 2014. "Informational rents in oil and gas concession auctions in Brazil," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 93-101.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Iledare, Omowumi O. & Pulsipher, Allan G., 2007. "Joint bidding restriction policy for selective E&P firms in the US Gulf of Mexico OCS: How persuasive is its effectiveness?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 3126-3133, June.
    2. Levitt, Clinton J., 2016. "Information spillovers in onshore oil and gas exploration," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 80-98.
    3. Haile, Philip & Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert, 2010. "Recent U.S. offshore oil and gas lease bidding: A progress report," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 390-396, July.
    4. Ken Hendricks & Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, 2003. "Bidding Rings and the Winner's Curse: The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," NBER Working Papers 9836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
    6. Matoso, Rafael & Rezende, Marcelo, 2014. "Asymmetric information in oil and gas lease auctions with a national company," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 72-82.
    7. Karen Maguire, 2013. "Drill Baby Drill? Political and Market Influences on Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing in the Western United States," Economics Working Paper Series 1401, Oklahoma State University, Department of Economics and Legal Studies in Business, revised Apr 2013.
    8. Virag, Gabor, 2007. "Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 156-177, October.
    9. Ronald M. Harstad, 2007. "Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder?," Working Papers 0711, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    10. Ken Hendricks & Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, 2008. "Bidding rings and the winner's curse," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1018-1041, December.
    11. Sundström, David, 2016. "On Specification and Inference in the Econometrics of Public Procurement," Umeå Economic Studies 931, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    12. repec:fgv:epgrbe:v:66:n:4:a:2 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November.
    14. Margolis, Michael & Shogren, Jason F., 2004. "Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 141-147, July.
    15. Vissing, Ashley, 2015. "Private Contracts as Regulation: A Study of Private Lease Negotiations Using the Texas Natural Gas Industry," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 44(2), pages 1-18, August.
    16. Hsu, Kuang-Chung & Wright, Michael & Zhu, Zhen, 2017. "What motivates merger and acquisition activities in the upstream oil & gas sectors in the U.S.?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 240-250.
    17. Peruchin Tomas Francisco, 2025. "Shifting the Bidding Game: Reform of Auction Design for Petroleum Exploration and Production Rights in Argentina," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4827, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    18. Glenn Boyle & Gerald Ward, 2018. "Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better? A Buyback Puzzle," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2137-2157, October.
    19. John Hoven, 2007. "Anticompetitive Restraints on Public Charter Schools," EAG Competition Advocacy Papers 200711, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    20. Lin, C.-Y. Cynthia & Leighty, Wayne, 2007. "Government Leasing Policy and the Multi-Stage Investment Timing Game in Offshore Petroleum Production," Institute of Transportation Studies, Working Paper Series qt0x81x3jp, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Davis.
    21. Matthew J. Clayton & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999. "The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-055, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:26:y:2004:i:2:p:239-259. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eneco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.