Industrial loans and market structure
This paper is concerned with the interactions between the structure of the banking sector and the product market. We consider a framework where firms' installation costs are financed by means of industrial loans from specialized banks. Initially, we assume that an exogenous number of banks compete in providing loans before the firms compete in prices in a market with product differentiation. We show that even a small decrease in the number of banks can cause a dramatic fall in competition among firms.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Economides, Nicholas, 1989. "Symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 178-194, February.
- Cestone, Giacinta & White, Lucy, 2002.
"Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: The Design of Financial Claims,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3182, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Giacinta Cestone & Lucy White, 2003. "Anticompetitive Financial Contracting: The Design of Financial Claims," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2109-2142, October.
- Giacinta Cestone & Lucy White, "undated". "Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: The Design Of Financial Claims," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 453.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Cestone, G. & White, L., 1999. "Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: the Design of Financial Claims," Papers 99.525, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
- Stefan ARPING, 2000.
"Banking, Commerce, and Antitrust,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
00.22, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, revised May 2002.
- Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1991.
"Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60.
- Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1989. "Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: evidence from Japanese industrial groups," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 82, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1995.
"The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 110(2), pages 407-443.
- Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1994. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," NBER Working Papers 4921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gonzalez-Maestre, M. & Granero, L.M., 1997.
"Industrial Loans and Market Structure,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
396.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Allen N. Berger & Leora Klapper & Gregory F. Udell, 2001.
"The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses,"
709, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Berger, Allen N. & Klapper, Leora F. & Udell, Gregory F., 2001. "The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 2127-2167, December.
- Allen N. Berger & Leora Klapper & Gregory F. Udell, 2001. "The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-34, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Berger, Allen N. & Klapper, Leora F. & Udell, Gregory F., 2001. "The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2656, The World Bank.
- Jaskold Gabszewicz, J. & Thisse, J. -F., 1980.
"Entry (and exit) in a differentiated industry,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 327-338, April.
- Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1995. "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 351-381, July.
- Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
- Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1983. "Natural Oligopolies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(5), pages 1469-1483, September.
- Enrica Detragiache & Paolo Garella & Luigi Guiso, 2000. "Multiple versus Single Banking Relationships: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1133-1161, 06.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:47:y:2003:i:5:p:841-855. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.