IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v162y2024ics0014292123002891.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The normative permissiveness of political partyism

Author

Listed:
  • Lane, Tom
  • Miller, Luis
  • Rodriguez, Isabel

Abstract

Political party identity has become one of the strongest social divides within many Western societies. This paper employs experiments to measure discrimination along different dimensions of social identity, and replicates previous findings showing the strongest discrimination against out-groups occurs in the political party domain. Moreover, we explore a possible explanation for this phenomenon based on social norms. We measure the social appropriateness of discrimination along each identity dimension. The ranking of dimensions by discrimination against out-groups reflects the extent to which such behaviour is normatively permissible, with the weakest anti-discrimination norms on the political party dimension. Results are qualitatively similar in two European countries. We argue that, while strong norms sanctioning discrimination on other dimensions have developed historically, no such process has taken place concerning party affiliation, bringing partisan identity to the fore and helping polarisation flourish.

Suggested Citation

  • Lane, Tom & Miller, Luis & Rodriguez, Isabel, 2024. "The normative permissiveness of political partyism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:162:y:2024:i:c:s0014292123002891
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104661
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292123002891
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104661?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bicchieri, Cristina & Dimant, Eugen & Gächter, Simon & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2022. "Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 59-72.
    2. Erik O. Kimbrough & Alexander Vostroknutov, 2016. "Norms Make Preferences Social," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 608-638, June.
    3. Francesco Fallucchi & Daniele Nosenzo, 2022. "The coordinating power of social norms," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, February.
    4. Erin L. Krupka & Roberto A. Weber, 2013. "Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 495-524, June.
    5. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    6. Allcott, Hunt, 2011. "Social norms and energy conservation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(9-10), pages 1082-1095, October.
    7. Michelitch, Kristin, 2015. "Does Electoral Competition Exacerbate Interethnic or Interpartisan Economic Discrimination? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Market Price Bargaining," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(1), pages 43-61, February.
    8. Aron Szekely & Francesca Lipari & Alberto Antonioni & Mario Paolucci & Angel Sánchez & Luca Tummolini & Giulia Andrighetto, 2021. "Evidence from a long-term experiment that collective risks change social norms and promote cooperation," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 12(1), pages 1-7, December.
    9. Restrepo-Plaza, Lina & Fatas, Enrique, 2022. "When ingroup favoritism is not the social norm a lab-in-the-field experiment with victims and non-victims of conflict in Colombia," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 194(C), pages 363-383.
    10. Simon Gächter & Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2013. "Peer Effects In Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms Or Social Preferences?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 548-573, June.
    11. Erin L. Krupka & Stephen Leider & Ming Jiang, 2017. "A Meeting of the Minds: Informal Agreements and Social Norms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(6), pages 1708-1729, June.
    12. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
    13. Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, 2015. "Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(3), pages 690-707, July.
    14. Allcott, Hunt, 2011. "Social norms and energy conservation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(9), pages 1082-1095.
    15. Lane, Tom, 2016. "Discrimination in the laboratory: A meta-analysis of economics experiments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 375-402.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kölle, Felix & Quercia, Simone, 2021. "The influence of empirical and normative expectations on cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 691-703.
    2. Apffelstaedt, Arno & Freundt, Jana & Oslislo, Christoph, 2022. "Social norms and elections: How elected rules can make behavior (in)appropriate," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 196(C), pages 148-177.
    3. Barr, Abigail & Lane, Tom & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2018. "On the social inappropriateness of discrimination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 153-164.
    4. Michalis Drouvelis & Adam Isen & Benjamin M. Marx, 2019. "The Bonus-Income Donation Norm," CESifo Working Paper Series 7961, CESifo.
    5. Schmidt, Robert J., 2019. "Do injunctive or descriptive social norms elicited using coordination games better explain social preferences?," Working Papers 0668, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    6. Gächter, Simon & Gerhards, Leonie & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2017. "The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 72-86.
    7. Arno Apffelstaedt & Jana Freundt & Christoph Oslislo, 2021. "Social Norms and Elections: How Elected Rules Can Make Behavior (In)Appropriate," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 068, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    8. D'Adda, Giovanna & Drouvelis, Michalis & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2016. "Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: Testing for order effects," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1-7.
    9. Tom Lane & Daniele Nosenzo & Silvia Sonderegger, 2023. "Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(5), pages 1255-1293, May.
    10. Timo Goeschl & Sara Elisa Kettner & Johannes Lohse & Christiane Schwieren, 2018. "From Social Information to Social Norms: Evidence from Two Experiments on Donation Behaviour," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-25, November.
    11. Felix Kölle & Thomas Lauer, 2020. "Understanding Cooperation in an Intertemporal Context," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 046, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    12. Traub, Stefan & Schwaninger, Manuel & Paetzel, Fabian & Neuhofer, Sabine, 2023. "Evidence on need-sensitive giving behavior: An experimental approach to the acknowledgment of needs," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    13. Behnk, Sascha & Hao, Li & Reuben, Ernesto, 2022. "Shifting normative beliefs: On why groups behave more antisocially than individuals," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    14. Heinicke, Franziska & König-Kersting, Christian & Schmidt, Robert, 2022. "Injunctive vs. descriptive social norms and reference group dependence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 199-218.
    15. Kandul, Serhiy & Lanz, Bruno, 2021. "Public good provision, in-group cooperation and out-group descriptive norms: A lab experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    16. Felix Koelle & Tom Lane & Daniele Nosenzo & Chris Starmer, 2017. "Nudging the electorate: what works and why?," Discussion Papers 2017-16, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    17. Eugen Dimant & Tobias Gesche, 2021. "Nudging Enforcers: How Norm Perceptions and Motives for Lying Shape Sanctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9385, CESifo.
    18. Christian König-Kersting, 2021. "On the Robustness of Social Norm Elicitation," Working Papers 2021-02, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    19. Offiaeli, K. & Yaman, F., 2020. "Social Norms as a Cost-Effective Measure of Managing Transport Demand: Evidence from an Experiment on the London Underground," Working Papers 20/07, Department of Economics, City University London.
    20. Francesco Fallucchi & Daniele Nosenzo, 2022. "The coordinating power of social norms," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social norms; Polarization; Group identity; Laboratory experiments; Discrimination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:162:y:2024:i:c:s0014292123002891. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.