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Imperfect certification in a Bertrand duopoly

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  • Bottega, Lucie
  • De Freitas, Jenny

Abstract

A label that imperfectly signals product quality is analyzed in a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Considering strategic firms when certification is imperfect has some important implications. A separating equilibrium can be sustained with a free test due to price strategic complementarity. When the certifier’s objective is welfare, and the test cost is sufficiently small, the most appropriate test is that which is subject to a low rate of false negatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Bottega, Lucie & De Freitas, Jenny, 2019. "Imperfect certification in a Bertrand duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 33-36.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:178:y:2019:i:c:p:33-36
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles Mason, 2011. "Eco-Labeling and Market Equilibria with Noisy Certification Tests," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 48(4), pages 537-560, April.
    2. Gu, Yiquan, 2008. "Imperfect Certification," Ruhr Economic Papers 78, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    3. De, Sankar & Nabar, Prafulla, 1991. "Economic implications of imperfect quality certification," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 333-337, December.
    4. Avner Shaked & John Sutton, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13.
    5. Lisette Ibanez & Gilles Grolleau, 2008. "Can Ecolabeling Schemes Preserve the Environment?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(2), pages 233-249, June.
    6. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    7. Mason, Charles F & Sterbenz, Frederic P, 1994. "Imperfect Product Testing and Market Size," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(1), pages 61-86, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fritz, Qi Gao, 2023. "Label to match - Firms’ signaling decisions when not everyone cares," SocArXiv ay8rq, Center for Open Science.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; Quality certification; Imperfect test; Labeling; Bertrand duopoly; Separating equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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