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A note on the continuity of the optimal auction

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  • Monteiro, Paulo Klinger

Abstract

In the independent private values auction model I study the continuity properties of the optimal auction revenue as a function of the valuations or types distribution. I show that the optimal revenue is lowersemicontinuous for convergence in distribution. If the limit distribution is continuous, the optimal auction revenue is continuous in distribution as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2015. "A note on the continuity of the optimal auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 127-130.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:137:y:2015:i:c:p:127-130
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.030
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Svaiter, Benar Fux, 2010. "Optimal auction with a general distribution: Virtual valuation without densities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 21-31, January.
    2. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023. "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal auction; Convergence in distribution; Independent private values;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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