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Step thinking and costly coordination

Author

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  • Fatas, Enrique
  • Morales, Antonio J.

Abstract

Using the experimental sessions of Goeree and Holt (2005), we show that step thinking fits the long-run outcome of minimum-effort and median-effort games surprisingly well for all values of the cost parameter. In the latter, the predicted discontinuous behaviour of step thinking accommodates the bimodal pattern observed for the intermediate values of the cost parameter quite well.

Suggested Citation

  • Fatas, Enrique & Morales, Antonio J., 2013. "Step thinking and costly coordination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 181-183.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:181-183
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.032
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W., 1995. "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 218-254, July.
    2. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
    3. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
    4. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-1326, December.
    5. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2013. "Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 5-62, March.
    6. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2005. "An experimental study of costly coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 349-364, May.
    7. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898.
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    Cited by:

    1. Enrique Fatas & Ernan Haruvy & Antonio J. Morales, 2014. "A Psychological Reexamination of the Bertrand Paradox," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(4), pages 948-967, April.
    2. Chen, Yan & Li, Sherry Xin & Liu, Tracy Xiao & Shih, Margaret, 2014. "Which hat to wear? Impact of natural identities on coordination and cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 58-86.
    3. Antonio J. Morales & Enrique Fatas, 2021. "Price competition and nominal illusion: experimental evidence and a behavioural model," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 607-632, December.

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    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

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