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Parochial altruism in inter-group conflicts

Author

Listed:
  • Abbink, Klaus
  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Herrmann, Benedikt
  • Orzen, Henrik

Abstract

We investigate parochial altruism, the combination of in-group altruism and out-group hostility, in an experimental conflict game preceded by a prisoner’s dilemma. Our data are consistent with parochial altruism, but cannot be explained by in-group pro-sociality or out-group hostility alone.

Suggested Citation

  • Abbink, Klaus & Brandts, Jordi & Herrmann, Benedikt & Orzen, Henrik, 2012. "Parochial altruism in inter-group conflicts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 45-48.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:45-48
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.083
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    2. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2011. "Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(2), pages 573-590, April.
    3. Roman Sheremeta & Jingjing Zhang, 2010. "Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 175-197, July.
    4. Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C., 2011. "Rent seeking in groups," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 116-125, January.
    5. Edward Millner & Michael Pratt, 1989. "An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 139-151, August.
    6. R. Mark Isaac & Stanley S. Reynolds, 1988. "Appropriability and Market Structure in a Stochastic Invention Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(4), pages 647-671.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    2. Changxia Ke & Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2015. "Alliances In The Shadow Of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 854-871, April.
    3. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Jeon, Joo Young & Ramalingam, Abhijit, 2016. "Identity and group conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 107-121.
    4. Robert Böhm & Jürgen Fleiß & Robert Rybnicek, 2017. "Social Preferences in Inter-Group Conflict," Working Paper Series, Social and Economic Sciences 2017-06, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Karl-Franzens-University Graz.
    5. Surajeet Chakravarty & Miguel A. Fonseca & Sudeep Ghosh & Sugata Marjit, 2015. "Religious fragmentation, social identity and rent-seeking: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in India," Discussion Papers 1512, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    6. Zaunbrecher, Henrik & Riedl, Arno, 2016. "Social Identity and Group Contests," Research Memorandum 024, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    7. Prediger, Sebastian & Vollan, Björn & Herrmann, Benedikt, 2014. "Resource scarcity and antisocial behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-9.
    8. Fu, Qiang & Ke, Changxia & Tan, Fangfang, 2015. "“Success breeds success” or “Pride goes before a fall”?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 57-79.
    9. Abbink, Klaus & de Haan, Thomas, 2014. "Trust on the brink of Armageddon: The first-strike game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 190-196.
    10. Julien Benistant & Marie Claire Villeval, 2017. "Unethical Behavior and Group Identity in Contests," Working Papers 1725, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    11. Chen, Zhuoqiong & Ong, David & Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "Competition Between and Within Universities: Theoretical and Experimental Investigation of Group Identity and the Desire to Win," MPRA Paper 67522, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research," MPRA Paper 67515, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Bhattacharya, Puja, 2016. "Inter-team contests with power differential," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 157-175.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Parochial altruism; Conflict; Experiments;

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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