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Earnings of rejected applicants to the Social Security Disability Insurance program

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  • Singleton, Perry

Abstract

This study bounds the potential earnings of accepted disability applicants by the post-application earnings of rejected applicants. Compositional differences between the two groups are addressed using a reweighting estimator. As shown, the bound on earnings is similar regardless of weighting.

Suggested Citation

  • Singleton, Perry, 2012. "Earnings of rejected applicants to the Social Security Disability Insurance program," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 147-150.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:2:p:147-150
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.02.028
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bound, John, 1989. "The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 482-503, June.
    2. Seth Giertz & Jeffrey Kubik, 2011. "The Disability Screening Process and the Labor Market Behavior of Accepted and Rejected Applicants: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 237-253, September.
    3. Patrick Kline, 2011. "Oaxaca-Blinder as a Reweighting Estimator," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 532-537, May.
    4. Kerwin Kofi Charles, 2003. "The Longitudinal Structure of Earnings Losses among Work-Limited Disabled Workers," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 38(3).
    5. David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, 2006. "The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(3), pages 71-96, Summer.
    6. Chen, Susan & van der Klaauw, Wilbert, 2008. "The work disincentive effects of the disability insurance program in the 1990s," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 757-784, February.
    7. Lahiri, Kajal & Song, Jae & Wixon, Bernard, 2008. "A model of Social Security Disability Insurance using matched SIPP/Administrative data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1-2), pages 4-20, July.
    8. Guido W. Imbens, 2004. "Nonparametric Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Under Exogeneity: A Review," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(1), pages 4-29, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Perry Singleton, 2012. "The Effects of Disability Insurance: Evidence From Social Security's Disabled-Widow Program," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 148, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
    2. Myhre, Andreas, 2021. "Intensive and Extensive Margin Labor Supply Responses to Kinks in Disability Insurance Programs," MPRA Paper 109547, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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