Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders
This paper shows the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in auctions with both common-value bidders and private-value ones. In equilibrium, the common-value bidders bid less aggressively when there are more private-value bidders. Further, resale is discussed as an application.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2004.
"On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions,"
Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1105-1125, 07.
- Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp292, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Theo Offerman, 2002.
"Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Virginia Economics Online Papers 347, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Matthew Jackson, 2009.
"Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 137-145, April.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Non-Existence of Equilibrium in Vickrey, Second-Price, and English Auctions," Working Papers 1241, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2003.
"Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 598-613, 07.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 1999. "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Virginia Economics Online Papers 337, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Isa Hafalir & Vijay Krishna, 2008. "Asymmetric Auctions with Resale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 87-112, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:1:p:99-103. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.