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Multimarket contact in continuous-time games

Author

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  • Kobayashi, Hajime
  • Ohta, Katsunori

Abstract

This paper investigates whether multimarket contact is effective in increasing the value of collusion. We show that for any discount rate, the set of equilibrium payoffs (average per market) expands through multimarket contact in continuous-time games.

Suggested Citation

  • Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori, 2008. "Multimarket contact in continuous-time games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 4-5, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:1:p:4-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yuliy Sannikov, 2007. "Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(5), pages 1285-1329, September.
    2. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
    3. Corwin D. Edwards, 1955. "Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power," NBER Chapters, in: Business Concentration and Price Policy, pages 331-359, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori, 2012. "Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 636-647.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C72 C73 L13 Multimarket contact Continuous-time games;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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