Escaping the "polluter pays" trap: Financing wastewater treatment on the Tijuana-San Diego border
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thomson, William, 1994.
"Cooperative models of bargaining,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284
- Young, H.P., 1994. "Cost allocation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 34, pages 1193-1235 Elsevier.
- Linda Fernandez, 2004. "Revealed Preferences of an International Trade and Environment Institution," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 80(2), pages 224-238.
- Giles Atkinson & Fernando Machado & Susana Mourato, 2000. "Balancing competing principles of environmental equity," Environment and Planning A, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 32(10), pages 1791-1806, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:63:y:2007:i:2-3:p:485-498. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.