The influence of an NCLB accountability plan on the distribution of student test score gains
Previous research on the effect of accountability programs on the distribution of student test score gains is decidedly mixed. This study examines the issue by estimating an educational production function in which test score gains are a function of the incentives schools have to focus instruction on below-proficient students. NCLB's threat of sanctions are positively correlated with test score gains by below-proficient students in failing schools; greater than expected test score gains by below-proficient students do not occur at the expense of high-performing students in failing schools. This pattern of results tends to suggest that failing schools were able to benefit low-performing students in ways that were consistent with having operational slack, and that the threat of sanctions may stimulate greater productivity within failing schools.
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- Kenneth Y. Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2005.
"The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions That Use Test Scores to Rank Schools,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1237-1258, September.
- Kenneth Y. Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2003. "The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions that Use Test Scores to Rank Schools," NBER Working Papers 10118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, 2006. "The Efficacy of Choice Threats Within School Accountability Systems: Results from Legislatively Induced Experiments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(510), pages C46-C62, 03.
- Burgess, Simon & Propper, Carol & Slater, Helen & Wilson, Deborah, 2005.
"Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5248, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Helen Slater & Deborah Wilson, 2005. "Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/128, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- David N. Figlio & Cecilia Rouse, 2005.
"Do Accountability and Voucher Threats Improve Low-Performing Schools?,"
NBER Working Papers
11597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Figlio, David N. & Rouse, Cecilia Elena, 2006. "Do accountability and voucher threats improve low-performing schools?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 239-255, January.
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