IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Robust monetary rules under unstructured model uncertainty

  • Levine, Paul
  • Pearlman, Joseph

This paper revisits a widely adopted approach to robust decision making developed by (Hansen and Sargent, 2003) and (Hansen and Sargent, 2008)--henceforth HS--and applies it to monetary policy design in the face of model uncertainty. We pay particular attention to two issues: first, we distinguish three possible forms of the implied game between malign nature and the policymaker in the HS procedure each leading to a different robust and approximating equilibria. Second, we impose the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate. We show that the ZLB constraint has serious consequences for a policymaker pursuing HS-type robustness, especially when accompanied by an inability to commit.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 456-471

in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:34:y:2010:i:3:p:456-471
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Richard Dennis & Kai Leitemo & Ulf Soderstrom, 2006. "Methods for Robust Control," 2006 Meeting Papers 493, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Levine, Paul, 1992. " Should Rules Be Simple?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 113-38.
  3. Leitemo, Kai & Söderström, Ulf, 2004. "Robust Monetary Policy in the New-Keynesian Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 4805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Coenen, Günter & Wieland, Volker, 2003. "The Zero-Interest Rate Bound and the Role of the Exchange Rate for Monetary Policy in Japan," CEPR Discussion Papers 3895, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Walsh, Carl E., 2004. "Implications of a Changing Economic Structure for the Strategy of Monetary Policy," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt84g1q1g6, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
  6. Nicoletta Batini & Alejandro Justiniano & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 2004. "Robust Inflation-Forecast-Based Rules to Shield against Indeterminacy," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0804, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  7. Giordani, Paolo & Söderlind, Paul, 2002. "Solution of Macromodels with Hansen-Sargent Robust Policies: Some Extensions," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 499, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 15 May 2003.
  8. Coenen, Günter, 2003. "Inflation persistence and robust monetary policy design," Working Paper Series 0290, European Central Bank.
  9. Hansen, Lars Peter & Sargent, Thomas J., 2003. "Robust control of forward-looking models," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 581-604, April.
  10. Richard Dennis & Ulf Soderstrom, 2002. "How important is precommitment for monetary policy?," Working Paper Series 2002-10, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  11. Leitemo, Kai & Söderström, Ulf, 2008. "Robust monetary policy in a small open economy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 3218-3252, October.
  12. Gino Cateau, 2006. "Guarding Against Large Policy Errors under Model Uncertainty," Staff Working Papers 06-13, Bank of Canada.
  13. Blanchard, Olivier J & Galí, Jordi, 2008. "Labour Markets and Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Model with Unemployment," CEPR Discussion Papers 6765, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. J. Tetlow, Robert & von zur Muehlen, Peter, 2001. "Robust monetary policy with misspecified models: Does model uncertainty always call for attenuated policy?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(6-7), pages 911-949, June.
  15. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & George Perendia, 2007. "Estimating DSGE Models under Partial Information," CDMA Working Paper Series 200722, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis.
  16. Levine, Paul, 2008. "Robust monetary rules under unstructured and structured model uncertainty," Working Paper Series 0899, European Central Bank.
  17. Soderlind, Paul, 1999. "Solution and estimation of RE macromodels with optimal policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 813-823, April.
  18. Levine, Paul & McAdam, Peter & Pearlman, Joseph G. & Pierse, Richard, 2008. "Risk Management in Action. Robust monetary policy rules under structured uncertainty," Working Paper Series 0870, European Central Bank.
  19. Adam, Klaus & Billi, Roberto M., 2007. "Discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 728-752, April.
  20. Giannoni, Marc P., 2002. "Does Model Uncertainty Justify Caution? Robust Optimal Monetary Policy In A Forward-Looking Model," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(01), pages 111-144, February.
  21. Levine, Paul & McAdam, Peter & Pearlman, Joseph G., 2007. "Quantifying and sustaining welfare gains from monetary commitment," Working Paper Series 0709, European Central Bank.
  22. Eggertsson, Gauti B., 2006. "The Deflation Bias and Committing to Being Irresponsible," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(2), pages 283-321, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:34:y:2010:i:3:p:456-471. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.