Schooling, wages and profits: Negative pecuniary externalities from schooling and their consequences for schooling investments
This paper tests the hypothesis that the schooling of the poor reduces profits for landowners, and that such negative pecuniary externalities in turn adversely affect schooling investments made by local governments. A theoretical model of occupational choice in the presence of credit and labor market constraints, combined with existing political economy models of the delivery of local public goods delivers such a result. This hypothesis is tested using household data from India. The empirical analysis shows that profits are reduced by the schooling of the poor and that this is primarily because of the effect of schooling on wages. It also shows that the negative effect of wages on profits reduces government provided schooling inputs.
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