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Dividend hibernation and future earnings: When no dividend news is good news

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  • Drienko, Jo
  • Khorsand, Bardia

Abstract

Firms frequently enter dividend hibernation, periods during which dividends remain unchanged for consecutive quarters. We employ a dividend event framework to show that, compared to non-hibernating firms, hibernators experience higher unexpected future earnings growth for up to five years by reducing underinvestment. We construct an index of adverse selection measures and find that hibernating firms are more opaque, indicating that the information gap between insiders and outsiders widens when there is no change in dividends. Extended hibernation episodes increase the opaqueness, while dividend changes after prolonged periods of fixed dividends reduce the information gap more promptly.

Suggested Citation

  • Drienko, Jo & Khorsand, Bardia, 2023. "Dividend hibernation and future earnings: When no dividend news is good news," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:83:y:2023:i:c:s0929119923001517
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102502
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information asymmetry; Dividend signaling theory; Payout policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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