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Effects of punishment driven by inequity aversion on promoting cooperation in public goods games

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  • Ding, Rui
  • Wang, Xianjia
  • Zhao, Jinhua
  • Gu, Cuiling

Abstract

Unlike traditional punishment mechanisms, which target individuals adopting specific strategies, punishers driven by inequity aversion focus on individuals with higher payoffs. The intensity of punishment varies based on the difference in payoffs. This paper examines the cooperation-promoting effect of this unique punishment mechanism within a structured population. Specifically, we study the evolutionary dynamics of two three-strategy systems in public goods games (PGGs), comprising cooperators, inequity-averse individuals, and defectors. Furthermore, we analyze the spatial dynamics and the evolution of characteristic spatial distributions of strategies to uncover the mechanisms underlying various phases and phase transitions. Our findings indicate that cooperation is enhanced regardless of whether the punishment is enforced by cooperators or defectors. When inequity-averse individuals cooperate in PGGs, punishing defectors at the cluster boundary fosters cooperation. However, mutual punishment among inequity-averse individuals diminishes the efficiency of cooperation promotion. For inequity-averse defectors, low punishment intensity safeguards cooperators from defector invasion, while high punishment intensity against defectors facilitates the spread of cooperation among them.

Suggested Citation

  • Ding, Rui & Wang, Xianjia & Zhao, Jinhua & Gu, Cuiling, 2025. "Effects of punishment driven by inequity aversion on promoting cooperation in public goods games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:190:y:2025:i:c:s0960077924013304
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2024.115778
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