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Optimal input cost sharing for tenants: Implications for negotiating efficiency

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  • Paudel, Krishna P.
  • Lohr, Luanne
  • Martin, Neil R.

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  • Paudel, Krishna P. & Lohr, Luanne & Martin, Neil R., 1998. "Optimal input cost sharing for tenants: Implications for negotiating efficiency," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-11, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:agisys:v:57:y:1998:i:1:p:1-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, 1993. "Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 78-100, Spring.
    2. Tek-Ann Chew, 1993. "The Transactional Framework of Sharecropping: Further Implications," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 41(2), pages 209-221, July.
    3. Allen, Franklin, 1985. "On the Fixed Nature of Sharecropping Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(377), pages 30-48, March.
    4. Allen, Douglas & Lueck, Dean, 1992. "Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 397-426, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paudel, K. P. & Lohr, L. & Martin, N. R., 2000. "Effect of risk perspective on fertilizer choice by sharecroppers," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 115-128, November.

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