Optimal input cost sharing for tenants: Implications for negotiating efficiency
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- Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, 1993. "Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 78-100, Spring.
- Tek-Ann Chew, 1993. "The Transactional Framework of Sharecropping: Further Implications," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 41(2), pages 209-221, 07.
- Allen, Franklin, 1985. "On the Fixed Nature of Sharecropping Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(377), pages 30-48, March.
- Allen, Douglas & Lueck, Dean, 1992. "Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 397-426, October.
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