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Endogenous coalitions formations through technology transfers and fair prices

Author

Listed:
  • Helene Ferrer

    (Université de Caen Normandie, CNRS, Normandie Univ, CREM UMR6211)

  • Guillermo Owen

    (Naval Postgraduate School)

  • Fabrice Valognes

    (Université de Caen Normandie, CNRS, Normandie Univ, CREM UMR6211)

Abstract

We consider a situation in which members of an oligopoly have different technologies, which allow them to produce at different costs. Members may license their technology to other members. Using the Aumann-Dreze modification of the Shapley value, we compute fair prices for these licenses. We also study the problem of stability for these "licensing coalitions".

Suggested Citation

  • Helene Ferrer & Guillermo Owen & Fabrice Valognes, 2026. "Endogenous coalitions formations through technology transfers and fair prices," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 46(1), pages 198-208.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-25-00469
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2026/Volume46/EB-26-V46-I1-P17.pdf
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling

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