Do countries strategically improve their institutions to access increased debt relief?
This paper examines how indebted countries have reacted to the recent shift in the global debt relief architecture towards rewarding indebted countries that have ‘superior' institutions with increased debt relief by probing whether there is any empirical evidence to suggest that countries may be taking advantage of this shift. The findings suggest that debtor countries have quickly adapted to the shift by strategically improving in key areas of institutional governance prior to applying for debt relief.
Volume (Year): 33 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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