Low and High Types of Bidders in Asymmetric Auctions with A General Utility Function
We study asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders. We expand the results of Fibich et al. (2002) for asymmetric first-price auctions to a general utility function. We show that for low type bidders, the equality of equilibrium bids with symmetric, uniform distribution bids holds for the general case of a utility function. For high types of bidders, those with weaker distributions bid more aggressively than stronger bidders under mild assumptions of a utility function.
Volume (Year): 33 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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