Manilulation via endowments in university-admission problem
We consider a two-sided many-to-one matching model where universities offer scholarships to students. We show that every stable matching rule is manipulable by a university via destroying endowments under a fairly wide class of scholarship rules. Furthermore, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game and the set of stable matchings may be disjoint.
Volume (Year): 31 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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- Sertel, Murat R. & Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2002.
"Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-83, September.
- Murat Sertel, 2000. "Manipulability of the Men-(Women) Optimal Matching Rule via Endowments," Working Papers 0014, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
- Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2003.
"Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
598.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
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