Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness
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- Dai, Meixing, 2010. "Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness," MPRA Paper 28548, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2010.
References listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
Multiplicative uncertainty; optimal degree of conservativeness; Brainard conservatism; central bank transparency.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
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