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The Effect of Project Types and Technologies on Software Developers' Efforts

Author

Listed:
  • Byung Cho Kim

    (Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech)

  • Dongryul Lee

    (Department of Economics, Virginia Tech)

Abstract

Considering intrinsic valuation of software developers as the main motive for participating in open source projects, we examine the (Nash) equilibrium effort levels of the software developers in implementing projects that follow one of the three different technologies: the summation, the weakest-link, and the best-shot. Under the summation technology, developers having higher intrinsic valuation exert more effort in open source projects but all developers in commercial projects expend the same effort. Under the weakest-link technology, regardless of the types of the projects, all developers exert the same effort at equilibrium. In open source projects, the developer with the lowest intrinsic valuation has a crucial role in determining the equilibrium effort level while, in case of commercial projects, the equilibrium effort level is bounded by the net wage. Finally, under the best-shot technology, only one developer makes serious effort and the others free ride in both open source and commercial projects.

Suggested Citation

  • Byung Cho Kim & Dongryul Lee, 2009. "The Effect of Project Types and Technologies on Software Developers' Efforts," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 1796-1804.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00363
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Open Source Software; Intrinsic Motivation; Software Economics; Game Theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics
    • L0 - Industrial Organization - - General

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