Wholesale Price Discrimination between High Street Retailers and Online Retailers
We analyze wholesale pricing and retail pricing when a monopolistic manufacturer sells its product to a high street retailer and an online electronic retailer, which have different selling qualities and marginal selling costs. We observe that (1) the wholesale price for an online electronic retailer is higher than that for a high street retailer if an online electronic retailer's selling cost advantage is greater than its selling quality disadvantage for all consumers buying products, and (2) the retail price of the e-retailer is necessarily lower than that of the c-retailer independent of conditions.
Volume (Year): 12 (2007)
Issue (Month): 31 ()
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