Information sharing in emerging credit markets
This paper examines the lack of information flow in the credit markets of developing countries. We show that the miscoordination among financial intermediaries might explain why lenders don't share their information about the borrowers. The competition effect of more transparency in the market leads to a higher probability of default of the firm, also generating credit rationing.
Volume (Year): 4 (2007)
Issue (Month): 37 ()
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- Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris, 2001.
"Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt,"
FMG Discussion Papers
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- Karp, Larry & Lee, In Ho & Mason, Robin, 2007.
"A global game with strategic substitutes and complements,"
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Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 155-175, July.
- Karp, Larry & Lee, In Ho & Mason, Robin, 2003. "A global game with strategic substitutes and complements," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt09h2490x, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Hellwig, Christian, 2002. "Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 191-222, December.
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