This note develops a dynamic model of crime that determines the conditions under which it is optimal for a criminal to delay commission of a crime rather than committing it immediately. It also examines the optimal enforcement strategy in this context. We derive two results. The first is that it might be optimal to postpone a crime that is profitable now if its benefit increase quickly enough in the future and that a crime that is not yet optimal might become so in the future. The second is that it is optimal to underdeter crime.
Volume (Year): 11 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2001. "Optimal punishment when individuals may learn deviant values," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 271-285, September.
- Peter-Jan Engelen, 2004. "Criminal Behavior: A Real Option Approach With an Application to Restricting Illegal Insider Trading," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 329-352, May.
- Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-295, September.
- Davis, Michael L, 1988. "Time and Punishment: An Intertemporal Model of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(2), pages 383-390, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)