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Braucht Deutschland Kapazitätsmechanismen für Kraftwerke?: Eine Analyse des deutschen Marktes für Stromerzeugung

Listed author(s):
  • Veit Böckers
  • Leonie Giessing
  • Justus Haucap
  • Ulrich Heimeshoff
  • Jürgen Rösch

The fundamental change of energy policy in Germany (the so-called Energiewende) has lead to a discussion how the security of electricity supply will be affected by the heavily subsidised expansion of electricity generation from renewable energies, as electricity generation from renewable energies is much more fluctuating and, therefore, less reliable than conventional electricity generation plants. The key question is whether capacity mechanisms are needed to complement or even to substitute classical energy only markets. As it is not clear whether energy only markets can guarantee the long-term security of supply, capacity mechanisms are considered to guarantee sufficient investment into generation capacity. Even though there is no solid evidence that the current market system is failing to provide sufficient investment incentives, the deployment of renewable energies changes the profitability of conventional generation plants. Therefore, we discuss a possible capacity market model for Germany, but we also stress the fact that a capacity mechanism should not be introduced in the short term nor should it be implemented in Germany in isolation. Instead, the need for a capacity market needs to be discussed at a European level as energy markets are becoming increasingly integrated. For the transition period, extensions to the current system such as a cold reserve for emergency cases may be more easily implemented. Im Zuge der von der Bundesregierung eingeleiteten Energiewende wird zunehmend die Frage diskutiert, wie bei einem forcierten Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien und der dadurch zunehmenden Fluktuation der Stromerzeugung die Versorgungssicherheit gewährleistet werden kann. Zur Diskussion steht die Einführung von Kapazitätsmechanismen zur Ergänzung oder sogar als vollständiger Ersatz klassischer Energy-Only-Märkte. Da es fraglich ist, ob Energy-Only-Märkte langfristig die Versorgungssicherheit garantieren können, sollen Kapazitätsmechanismen sicherstellen, dass es zu ausreichenden Investitionen in den Kraftwerkspark kommt. Auch wenn es bisher keinen stichhaltigen Beleg dafür gibt, dass das derzeitige deutsche Marktsystem den Anforderungen an die Versorgungssicherheit nicht gerecht werden kann, verändert sich durch den massiven Ausbau fluktuierender erneuerbarer Energien die Profitabilität von Investitionen in konventionelle Kraftwerke. Wir stellen deshalb ein mögliches Kapazitätsmarktmodell für Deutschland vor, weisen aber zugleich darauf hin, dass ein derartiges System kurzfristig weder notwendig ist noch für Deutschland isoliert eingeführt werden sollte. Ein umfassender Kapazitätsmechanismus kann, wenn überhaupt, bei zusammenwachsenden Märkten nur auf europäischer Ebene sinnvoll implementiert werden. Für die Übergangsperiode sollte daher das bestehende Marktsystem gegebenenfalls um eine Kaltreserve für Notfälle ergänzt werden.

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Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.

Volume (Year): 81 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 73-90

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Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:81-1-6
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  1. Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Reliability and competitive electricity markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 60-84, 03.
  2. Cramton, Peter & Stoft, Steven, 2005. "A Capacity Market that Makes Sense," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 43-54.
  3. Joskow, Paul L., 2008. "Capacity payments in imperfect electricity markets: Need and design," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 159-170, September.
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