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Subprime-Krise, strukturierte Finanzierung und die Förderung der Mikrokreditvergabe

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  • Eva Terberger

Abstract

In the public opinion, micro credits and securitized sub prime loans represent quite contrasting types of fi nancial products. While the former stand for socially responsible fi nance the latter are regarded as toxic waste. This ignores that structured mortgage securities, like micro credit, had their origin in the public mission to create access to fi nance for the fi nancially excluded. Before and after the sub prime crisis, structured securitization is a viable way to attract private capital and, thereby, deepen fi nancial outreach to lower income customers. Not structured fi nance in itself, but the way it is publicly supported seems to be the key to enhancing fi nancial access without boosting the burden of systemic risk. In the U.S. implicit government guarantees were the quasi unlimited source to attract more private capital to the mortgage market while increasing the burden of public risk. Quite differently, microfi nance is supported by investing scarce donor funds into the junior tranches of microfi - nance investment vehicles. This attracts the investment of private capital into the senior tranches while the risk carried by donors and the support for microfi nance is transparent and clearly limited. Während Subprime-Kredite in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung Auswüchse des Finanzmarkts symbolisieren, stehen Mikrokredite für das Soziale in der Finanzwelt. Dabei wird übersehen, dass nicht nur Mikrokredite in Entwicklungsländern, sondern auch Hypothekarkredite in den USA gefördert wurden, um breiteren Bevölkerungsschichten den Zugang zu Kredit zu eröffnen. Für beide Kredittypen ist die strukturierte Finanzierung ein Instrument, um den Kapitalmarkt verstärkt zur Refinanzierung zu nutzen und so den Zugang zu Kredit auszuweiten. Zentrale Unterschiede bestehen jedoch darin, wie die Attraktivität der Anlage in verbrieften Hypothekarkrediten einerseits und in Mikrokrediten andererseits gefördert wird. In den USA boten implizite staatliche Garantien eine quasi unlimitierte Förderquelle, die zur Erhöhung systemischer Risiken beitrug. In der Mikrofinanzierung dagegen werden mit Fördermitteln nachrangig zu bedienende Tranchen von verbrieften Mikrofinanzinvestitionen erworben, um privates Kapital für die Anlage in den sichereren Tranchen zu gewinnen. So lassen sich die Vorteile der Refinanzierung über den Kapitalmarkt für die Mikrofinanzierung erschließen, ohne die Gefahr einer unkontrollierten Ausweitung von Risiken einzugehen.

Suggested Citation

  • Eva Terberger, 2009. "Subprime-Krise, strukturierte Finanzierung und die Förderung der Mikrokreditvergabe," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 78(1), pages 40-55.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:78-1-4
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.78.1.40
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Byström, Hans, 2007. "Structured Microfinance in China," Working Papers 2007:18, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    2. John M. Quigley, 2006. "Federal credit and insurance programs: housing," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 88(Jul), pages 281-310.
    3. Byström, Hans N.E., 2008. "The Microfinance Collateralized Debt Obligation: A Modern Robin Hood?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 2109-2126, November.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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